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Using a representational momentum paradigm, this study investigated the hypothesis that
judgments of how far another agent’s head has rotated are influenced by the perceived
gaze direction of the head. Participants observed a video-clip of a face rotating 60 towards
them starting from the left or right profile view. The gaze direction of the face was either
congruent with, ahead of, or lagging behind the angle of rotation. Following this, two static
faces, at varying angles of rotation with respect to the end-point angle of the face in the
video-clip, were presented simultaneously. The task of the participants was to decide
which of the two heads was at an angle best resembling the angle of the end-point of
the moving face. The critical test condition consisted of one test face oriented at 10 before,
and the other at 10 after the end-point. The ‘lagging behind’ gaze condition elicited a sig-
nificant underestimation of the rotation compared to the ‘congruent’ and ‘ahead’ gaze con-
ditions. Participants did not exhibit similar biases when judging the rotation of several
non-face control stimuli with visual features that mimicked different aspects of gaze direc-
tion. The findings suggest that when the gaze direction of a perceived agent is incongruent
with the direction of the agent’s head motion observers automatically utilise this discrep-
ancy to adjust their inferences about the agent’s intended heading direction.
 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
When observing an object in motion, the causes of its
motion are inferred depending on the nature of the object.
In the case of non-agentive objects, which are inanimate
and incapable of intentionality, the motion is assumed to
be the product of physical laws. To understand non-agen-
tive motion, a process of systemising is employed to find
the underlying principles that cause and constrain the ob-
ject’s motion. In the case of agentive objects, which are ani-
mate and possess intentionality, motion is also subject to
such factors, but in addition can be self-propelled and be
motivated by the goals and objectives of the agent (Lieber-
man, Gaunt, Gilbert, & Trope, 2002). To understand these. All rights reserved.
n).latter aspects of agentive motion, a process of empathising
is employed (including theory of mind) to attribute inten-
tions, emotions and mental states (Baron-Cohen, 1995).
The dichotomy can be seen when watching someone kick
a football. The player has certain objectives in doing so
(to score a goal or pass to another player) and so modifies
the kick accordingly to achieve a particular trajectory. The
movement of the player is therefore understood in terms of
his/her intentions. However, the behaviour of the ball is
not interpreted in such terms, the trajectory of which is
subject to systematic physical laws (e.g. force of kick, grav-
ity, and wind). Baron-Cohen (2002, 2006) has proposed
that an individual’s propensity to engage these two cogni-
tive processes may be related, with those individuals
showing greater empathising skills more likely to be
poorer in systemising, and vice versa.
Attributing intentionality to agentive motion engages
both automatic/involuntary and controlled systems in the
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are based on the perception of simple bodily cues such
as gaze direction, articulation of body parts, and the
environmental context (Jellema & Perrett, 2002, 2005). Its
subconscious nature ensures the inferences are made
quickly and effectively, which reflects the evolutionary
pressures placed on the ability to process large amounts
of dynamic social information (Dunbar, 1998).
Perceived gaze direction, in conjunction with head and
torso direction, allows the observer (i.e. the participant in
the experiment) to infer what the focus of an agent (i.e.
the experimental stimulus) is (Perrett, 1999), which im-
pacts on the observer’s own behaviour. Primates (Toma-
sello, Call, & Hare, 1998) and a variety of non-primates
(Emery, 2005) have been shown to modify their behaviour
in response to the gaze direction of conspecifics. The cur-
rent study focuses on the role of gaze and head cues in
anticipating others’ future actions. As attention is often fix-
ated on the goal of an action, discerning the direction of
gaze will generally allow the observer to discriminate be-
tween actions performed either intentionally or acciden-
tally (Jellema, Baker, Wicker, & Perrett, 2000), although
there exist notable exceptions to this rule. One can then
form expectancies as to how the action will most likely un-
fold in the immediate future (Perrett, Xiao, Jellema, Barrac-
lough, & Oram, 2006). Furthermore, knowing what another
person is looking at constitutes the basis of ToM (Baron-
Cohen, 1995; Charman et al, 2000).
The social significance of an averted gaze derives not
just from its orientation in relation to the observer, but also
from the agent’s own line of regard. Gaze direction appears
to be referenced initially in relation to the agent’s frame of
reference, and only then in relation to the observer (Bay-
liss, di Pellegrino, & Tipper, 2004; Bayliss & Tipper, 2006).
This has implications for social interactions. An averted
gaze will maximally elicit reflexive orienting of an obser-
ver’s spatial attention to the gazed-at location if gaze and
head are incongruently oriented, while the effect is less
strong when gaze and head are congruently aligned (Hieta-
nen, 1999; Hietanen, 2002; Langton & Bruce, 1999). This is
probably due to the fact that an incongruent gaze-head
alignment forms a conspicuous cue suggesting that a stim-
ulus has caught the person’s attention in the immediate
past (Bertenthal & Von Hofsten, 1998). In contrast, a con-
gruent alignment does not necessarily imply that attention
is directed at a specific stimulus.
These social inferences are supported by dedicated neu-
ral substrates within the visual system, most noticeably
the superior temporal sulcus (STS). The STS is implicated
in the processing of biological motion and bodily actions
(Allison, Puce, & McCarthy, 2000) and single cell studies
of the Macaque have revealed STS cell populations selec-
tively responsive to specific directions of gaze, head and
torso orientation, either in isolation or in conjunction (Per-
rett, Hietanen, Oram, & Benson, 1992). Such coding can be
either object-centred or viewer-centred (Jellema & Perrett,
2006). The discovery of STS cell populations coding for ac-
tions in relation to contextual cues rather than for actions
per se (Jellema, Maassen, & Perrett, 2004; Jellema et al.,
2000; Perrett, 1999), and of cell populations that are impli-
cated in deducing the end-point of an action sequencebased on the immediately preceding movements (Jellema
& Perrett, 2003b), have contributed to the idea that the
STS is involved in representing goal-directed and inten-
tional actions (Jellema & Perrett, 2005; Pelphrey, Morris,
Michelich, Allison, & McCarthy, 2005; Saxe, Xiao, Kovacs,
Perrett, & Kanwisher, 2004).
1.1. Memory displacement as a measure of causal
attributions made to agentive and non-agentive motion
The processing of gaze direction may support infer-
ences about the future course or the goal of agentive mo-
tion. As such it can play a critical role in the attribution of
intentionality. The reflexive nature of such attributions
are difficult to detect and measure, and may only be ver-
ified by their effects on performance in an indirect task.
Representational momentum (RM) tasks offer one way
to study these processes. Due to RM, the observer’s mem-
ory for the final position of a moving target is typically
displaced further along the observed trajectory. This phe-
nomenon results from the observer’s inferences regarding
the physical dynamics of the movement, and is hypothe-
sized to reflect an anticipatory function (Finke & Freyd,
1985; Freyd & Finke, 1984). The extent of the memory
displacement is subject to varying physical causes (e.g.
gravity) and constraints (e.g. friction) acting upon the ob-
ject’s motion (Hubbard, 1995). The displacement occurs
even for static images of implied motion (Freyd, 1983).
Importantly, the effect is subject to conceptual knowledge
the observer has about the nature of the object (Vinson &
Reed, 2002).
If the source of the object’s motion is implied to result
from a collision with another moving object, the discrep-
ancy between the remembered and veridical final posi-
tions may be less than if just the moving target is
presented. Therefore, if the object’s motion is self-pro-
pelled, it is subject to a greater anticipatory bias than if
it has no intrinsic means of movement (Hubbard, Bles-
sum, & Ruppel, 2001; Hubbard & Favretto, 2003; Hubbard
& Ruppel, 2002). Such self-propulsion is characteristic of
biological motion, and is one of several factors that in-
fants are sensitive to when distinguishing between ani-
mate and inanimate objects (Johnson, 2003). Indeed,
biological motion has been shown to be subject to antic-
ipatory displacements (Daems & Verfaillie, 1999; Verfail-
lie & Daems, 2002). In the case of agentive motion, cues
indicative of the causes of the motion can be both physi-
cal and intentional. There has been little research explic-
itly investigating whether displacement of agentive
motion is subject to the involuntary processing of social
cues conveying the goal of the action, though several
studies report related effects. For example, Freyd and
Miller (1992) observed a greater displacement for a sche-
matic animal moving forwards in the direction it was
looking than moving backwards, though Thornton and
Hayes (2004) dispute a role for social signals in RM. Lob-
maier, Fischer, and Schwaninger (2006) reported that the
perceived point to which another’s gaze is fixated is dis-
placed toward the location of environmental objects. This
suggests that a role for intentional attribution in RM is
worthy of investigation.
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The aim of the current study was to assess if involun-
tary processing of social cues conveying the goal of an
action and the state of mind of the agent contributes to
the anticipation of the agent’s behaviour in the immediate
future. More specifically, whether the memory displace-
ment in the case of an agent’s self-propelled motion was
subject not only to the physical invariants acting upon ob-
ject motion, but also to the observer’s inferences about the
intentions and motivations underpinning the motion. A
new task was introduced that was specifically designed
to measure the observer’s involuntary inference of an
agent’s intention on the basis of their gaze direction. The
task required participants to observe a video-clip starting
with a human face at a profile view (90), which rotates to-
wards them, stops at 30 (full frontal view is 0) and imme-
diately disappears. Next, two test faces were shown, with
face angles at different orientations selected from the ob-
served and extrapolated trajectory. Participants had to se-
lect the test face with the angle they think best resembled
the face angle in the last frame of the clip. The crucial
manipulation was that the gaze direction of the head in
the clip was varied: it was either lagging behind, in ad-
vance of, or congruent with, the head rotation. When gaze
is ahead of head orientation, there should be a relative
overestimation due to the perceived intention to carry on
in that direction, and when gaze is lagging behind head
rotation, there should be a relative underestimation due
to perceived unwillingness or hesitation to engage in fur-
ther rotation.
Several control stimuli that rotated in an identical way
were also tested. These contained attributes that were
comparable to the changes in the appearance of the eyes
in the three gaze conditions, however the inanimate look
was expected to elicit no sense of intentionality. In Exper-
iment 1, these features were oriented vertically within the
non-agentive stimulus so as to prevent the perception of a
face-like configuration and maintain the non-agentive nat-
ure. In Experiment 2, these features were placed in a hori-
zontal orientation to investigate if estimations of object
rotation varied when the visual features of the non-agen-
tive stimulus were oriented to reflect those of a face-like
configuration (but without creating the sense of an ani-
mate object). In an additional condition, the equivalent
‘gaze’ features were replaced by arrows, which possess
spatial meaning, and which could be related to the
direction of object rotation in much the same way as gaze
direction. The apparent self-propelled motion of the non-
agentive stimuli should exhibit RM due to assumptions
regarding its momentum, but this RM should not vary as
a consequence of the manipulations designed to mimic
the visual appearance of the gaze direction of the agentive
stimulus. The results of these experiments confirmed the
predictions, in that estimations of how far the agentive
stimulus had rotated varied as a function of gaze direction,
while no such variation was elicited by the equivalent con-
ditions for the non-agentive stimuli. The assumption that
agentive and non-agentive memory displacements evolved




Twenty-eight undergraduate psychology students (27
females) with a mean age of 21.5 years (SD = 9.1) from
the University of Hull participated in Experiment 1 for
course credit. All reported normal or corrected vision,
and provided their written informed consent prior to the
experiment.
2.2. Stimuli
Stimuli were created using Poser 6 animation software
(Curious Labs, Inc. & e-frontier, Inc). The stimuli were pre-
sented on a 21-inch monitor (100 Hz) using E-Prime soft-
ware (Psychology Software Tools, Inc). Two stimulus
conditions were created: agentive and non-agentive.
2.2.1. Agentive stimuli
Two human agents used in the agentive stimulus condi-
tion were ‘James’ (male) and ‘Jessi’ (female). Their shoul-
ders were oriented 45 away from the observer in the
direction the agent was facing (left or right), and remained
at that orientation throughout the stimulus presentation.
The head always rotated 60 toward the observer, starting
from a 90 deviation (i.e. full profile view) and ending at a
30 deviation from full frontal view (Fig. 1A). The motion
was induced through rapid presentation (40 ms/image) of
16 images (640 ms in total, at a rate of 93.8 per second),
depicting the object progressively rotating along its verti-
cal axis at 4 interpolations. The height of the subtended
angle was 7.0 for ‘Jessi’, and 6.5 for ‘James’. As the face ro-
tated, the width of the stimuli varied from 5.1 to 4.0 for
‘Jessi’, and 5.7 to 5.1 for ‘James’. The background colour
was grey. The crucial manipulation consisted of varying
the gaze direction of the agent relative to the direction of
the head movement: in 1/3 of the trials the gaze was direc-
ted 20 in advance of the head direction (gaze-ahead con-
dition), in 1/3 of the trials the gaze direction was the same
as the head direction (gaze congruent condition), and in 1/
3 of the trials the gaze direction was 20 lagging behind the
head direction (gaze-lagging condition; Fig. 1A).
2.2.2. Non-agentive stimuli
The non-agentive stimulus consisted of a cylinder of
comparable size, colour and texture to the agentive stimu-
lus (Fig. 1B). The subtended angle of the stimulus height
was 6.3, while the subtended angle of the stimulus width
varied from 4.3 to 3.3. It was placed on a disc of the same
diameter as the cylinder (but with different texture), which
provided a base upon which the object rotated analogous
to how the head rotated on the shoulders in the agentive
stimulus. The three white fins protruding from the cylinder
provided additional cues to the degree of rotation in the
same way as the chin and nose of the agentive stimulus
did. Placed in between the three fins were two white cubes
half submerged into the cylinder. Half of the surface area of
the cubes was coloured black, this area was either on the
Fig. 1. The three gaze conditions of the agentive (A) and non-agentive (B) stimuli. The starting point was a profile view (90), facing either to the right (Ai) or
left (Bi). The end-points were at 30 from full frontal view in the gaze-ahead (ii), gaze-lagging behind (iii) and gaze congruent (iv) conditions.
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mimicked the iris/sclera configuration in the three gaze
conditions and the nature of rotation was identical to that
of the agentive stimulus (Fig. 1B). In addition to controlling
for the effect of perceived intentionality on memory dis-
placement, the non-agentive stimulus also served to con-
trol for a possible ‘low-level’ contribution of the
horizontal shift of the pupil location to memory displace-
ment. In this respect it should be noted that the equivalent
of the gaze-manipulation in the non-agentive condition
was more conspicuous than the real eye gaze stimulus,
as the size of the black and white cube was considerably
larger than that of the eyes while it was also more promi-
nently positioned. Therefore, if it was the low-level
horizontal shift in pupil position per se which caused
the displacement in the agentive stimulus, then certainly
the non-agentive stimulus should evoke displacement as
a function of the equivalent of the gaze direction
manipulations.
2.2.3. Test stimuli
To measure the remembered position of rotation, par-
ticipants compared a pair of test stimuli with the end-point
of the video-clip (which was always at 30, left or right).
The test stimuli consisted of two still images of the rotating
agentive/non-agentive objects. They were shown simulta-
neously, side by side, each oriented at a different angle.
One was oriented before the end-point (i.e. at an orienta-
tion encompassed within the rotation trajectory of the
moving stimulus), the other after that point (i.e. extrapo-
lated beyond the end-point of the moving stimulus further
along the trajectory). One of the choices always deviated
by 10 either before (‘’) or after (‘+’) the stopping angle
of the rotating stimulus, while the other choice deviated
by 10, 20 or 40 in the opposite direction. This created
five test stimulus levels (40/+10, 20/+10, 10/
+10, 10/+20, 10/+40; left/right positions on the
screen were counterbalanced).
In symmetrical experimental trials, both test choices
deviated 10 from the stopping angle (10/+10,Fig. 2B). For these trials there was no correct answer. If
no memory displacement occurs, participants would be
no more likely to choose the ‘before’ or ‘after’ option, yield-
ing a 50/50 split on average. Occurrence of a memory dis-
placement, however, would result in a bias for one choice
over the other: a bias toward choosing the ‘after’ choice
would be indicative of overestimation and a bias toward
choosing the ‘before’ choice of underestimation.
In the asymmetrical experimental trials, the remaining
test choice was oriented 20 in the opposite direction. In
these trials either the ‘before’ choice (10/+20) or the
‘after’ choice (20/+10) was correct (Fig. 2C and D).
The aim was to see if gaze direction could induce errors
in the presence of a correct answer. Although a weaker ef-
fect of gaze direction is expected in asymmetrical com-
pared to symmetrical experimental trials, an effect of
gaze direction would strengthen the hypothesis should
it be present.
In the final two levels, the asymmetry was increased
even further by pairing the 10 choice with a 40 choice
(Fig. 2E and F). The correct answers, either ‘before’
(10/+40) or ‘after’ (40/+10), could easily be given
and ceiling performance was expected. Incorrect answers
here could be attributed to insufficient attention being
paid to the task, so these were designated as catch trials
and performance on these trials was used as a selection
criterion.
The height of the test stimuli were the same as for the
rotating stimuli. The two test stimuli were positioned in
the centre of the screen, at equal distances at either side
of fixation. The width and distance from the centre varied
according to the test stimulus used. The subtended width
between the outer edges of the two test stimuli was be-
tween 16.2 and 18.4, with the inner edge of each be-
tween 0.8 and 1.7 from the centre, and outer edge
between 8.4 and 9.6 from the centre. In the test stimuli,
the gaze direction (or its equivalent) was always congruent
with the angle of the head (or the control object). Left/right
screen positions of the ‘before’ and ‘after’ choices were
counterbalanced across trials.
Fig. 2. Examples of test stimuli. (A) The end-point position, at an angle 30 from full frontal view, of a head in the video-clip that started its rotation from a
left profile view. (B) Symmetrical experimental trials where neither choice is more similar to the end-point of the moving stimulus. (C–D) Asymmetrical
experimental trials where the ‘after’ (C) and ‘before’ (D) response was correct. (E–F) Catch trials in which the ‘after’ (E) and ‘before’ (F) response was correct.
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Participants sat 60 cm from the computer monitor. They
were instructed they would see a face or object rotate
along the vertical axis towards them, and that this would
be followed by two still faces or objects. Their task was
to indicate by pressing one of two keys on the keyboard
which of the two faces/objects was at an angle most simi-
lar to the final angle of the moving face/object. The ‘J’ and
‘L’ keys were used, labeled as ‘left’ and ‘right’ respectively.
No mention of gaze direction was made. It was stressed
that accuracy was more important than speed of response,
but that answers were to be made within a few seconds.
Participants completed 12 practice trials representative
of the range of manipulations. This was followed by the
experimental session which contained 2 blocks of 108 tri-
als (216 trials in total). In one block, a retention interval of
1000 ms was placed in between the rotating stimulus and
the test stimulus. In the other block, the retention interval
was absent. The presentation order of the two blocks was
counterbalanced across participants.
The choice of retention interval length was based on
studies using a similar method of data analysis. For exam-
ple, Finke and Freyd (1985) varied the retention interval
between 500 and 2000 ms and found the magnitude of er-
rors to peak within 500 ms and only to slowly decay there-
after. Freyd and Finke (1984) used retention intervals of
250, 500 and 750 ms and observed displacement at each.
In contrast, a study by Freyd and Johnson (1987) found
the displacement effect to peak at 250–300 ms and to rap-
idly decline thereafter. However, this latter study used a
different methodology in which the data was subjected
to a quadratic regression. It was therefore expected that
in this study a displacement effect would not rapidlydiminish after 250–300 ms and would still be evident at
a 1000 ms retention interval.
Each block contained three different types of trials:
symmetrical experimental trials (n = 36, 12 ‘James’, 12 ‘Jes-
sie’, 12 non-agentive), asymmetrical experimental trials
(n = 36, 12 ‘James’, 12 ‘Jessie’, 12 non-agentive; for half of
each group the correct answer was before the end-point,
i.e. 10/+20, for the other half after the end-point, i.e.
20/+10), and catch trials (n = 36, 12 ‘James’, 12 ‘Jessie’,
12 non-agentive; for half of each group the correct answer
was before the end-point, i.e. 10/+40, for the other half
after the end-point, i.e. 40/+10). The rotation started
either from the left profile (anti-clockwise) or from the
right profile (clockwise), with an equal number of trials
for each direction.
Each trial began with a 1000 ms fixation cross at the
centre of the screen. This was followed by a rotating face/
object (duration 640 ms). In trials with a retention interval,
the rotating stimulus was followed by a blank screen of
identical colour to the background of the rotating stimulus
for 1000 ms. Next, the test stimuli were displayed, and re-
mained on screen until a response was made. In trials with-
out a retention interval, the test stimulus was presented
immediately after the rotating stimulus. The inter-trial-
interval was 1000 ms. Fig. 3 shows an example of a trial.
After completion of the experiment, the participants
completed a feedback form. The purpose of this was to
assess whether participants had been aware of the
gaze-manipulation, to see how they experienced the con-
trol object, and to gauge what methods, if any, they used
to complete the task. For example, they were asked to
describe what they thought the rotating non-agentive
stimulus was and why it was moving.
Fig. 3. Example of a trial. The trial started with a fixation cross (A), followed after 1000 ms by the moving stimulus (B–C). In half the trials, this was followed
by a retention interval of 1000 ms duration (D), followed by the test stimulus (E). In the remaining trials, no retention interval was present, and the test
stimulus followed immediately after the moving stimulus.
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2.3.1. Data reduction
The overall error rate in the catch trials was 13.9%
(SD = 9.1). Participants whose mean error rate exceeded
20% were excluded from the analysis (6 participants),
resulting in a final group of 22 participants. In addition,
individual trials were removed if responses were made less
than 250 ms after onset of the test stimulus or in excess of
2.5SD of each participant’s mean reaction time. Of the
remaining participants, 2.4% of trials were excluded in this
way. On the basis of information provided on feedback
forms completed following the experiment, no further par-
ticipants were excluded.
2.3.2. The effect of gaze on agentive and non-agentive motion
As one of the test heads was always shown at an angle
before the stopping point, and the other at an angle after
the stopping point, these two choices are referred to as
the ‘before’ and ‘after’ choices for the sake of brevity. How-
ever, it should be noted that it was the participants’ task to
judge which of the two test heads most resembled the
head at the stopping point in the video; it was not their
task to make a judgment about whether the test head
was ‘before’ and ‘after’ the video head. Trials in which
the ‘before’ stimulus was judged as more similar to the
stopping point were coded as ‘0’, and those in which the
‘after’ stimulus was chosen were coded as ‘1’. The resultingTable 1
Mean percentage of ‘after’ choices for each gaze direction across each level of tes
percentages are shown between brackets.
Agentive stimulus
Ahead Congruent Lagging
40/+10 95.7 (7.9) 94.2 (13.2) 89.7 (18.
20/+10 78.6 (15.2) 71.8 (19.8) 65.8 (24.
10/+10 58.3 (17.1) 54.4 (22.9) 37.2 (20.
10/+20 37.8 (15.9) 29.6 (18.0) 20.9 (16.
10/+40 8.3 (9.3) 9.6 (9.9) 11.6 (12.scores thus reflected the mean percentage of trials in
which the ‘after’ test choice was judged as more similar
to the stopping angle than the ‘before’ test choice. These
values were entered into a repeated measures ANOVA with
stimulus type (agentive vs. non-agentive), Retention inter-
val (absent vs. present), Gaze direction (ahead vs. congru-
ent vs. lagging behind) and Test stimulus (20/+10 vs.
10/+10 vs. 10/+20) entered as the main factors.
Since the 40/+10 and 10/+40 conditions were used
as a means to exclude participants, these were not in-
cluded as levels in the test stimulus condition, although
the data for these trials are presented in the tables and fig-
ures for the purpose of comparison (see Table 1 and Fig. 4).
As expected, there was a significant main effect of Test
stimulus (F(2,42) = 157, p < .001, g2p ¼ :88) with the per-
centage of ‘after’ choices decreasing as the similarity of
the after choice to the moving stimulus’ end-point de-
creased. There was no main effect of Retention interval
(F(1,21) = .15, p = .704, g2p ¼ :007). There was a main effect
of stimulus type, with the non-agentive stimulus eliciting
significantly more ‘after’ choices than the agentive stimu-
lus (F(2,21) = 19.9, p < .001, g2p ¼ :49), and a main effect of
Gaze direction (F(2,42) = 13.3, p < .001, g2p ¼ :39). There
was a significant interaction between Gaze direction and
stimulus type (F(2,42) = 3.84, p = .029, g2p ¼ :16), and a sig-
nificant interaction between stimulus type and Test stimu-
lus (F(2,42) = 9.66, p < .001, g2p ¼ :315). None of the other
interactions were significant.t stimulus for the agentive and non-agentive stimuli. The SDs of the mean
Non-agentive stimulus
Ahead Congruent Lagging
6) 96.9 (7.6) 96.2 (8.1) 97.7 (6.3)
0) 80.6 (18.8) 77.1 (24.9) 71.1 (23.8)
5) 68.4 (23.0) 62.3 (21.0) 58.2 (26.3)
1) 55.0 (27.1) 45.8 (26.7) 48.1 (24.1)
0) 28.8 (24.5) 25.2 (23.0) 11.9 (21.1)
Fig. 4. Mean percentage of ‘after’ choices for each gaze direction across the levels of the test stimulus for the agentive stimulus (left) and the non-agentive
stimulus (right). Retention intervals were collapsed.
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stimulus type was investigated further by conducting
one-way repeated measures ANOVAs with Gaze direction
as the main effect for each stimulus type (agentive and
non-agentive) and for each test stimulus level. Where a
significant effect was found, paired sample t-tests between
all three gaze conditions were conducted with a Bonferroni
corrected p-value of .017 (0.05/3). In the symmetrical
experimental trials, one sample t-tests were also con-
ducted with a test value of 50% to test for a response bias
indicative of representational momentum. These tests
were two tailed when an effect of gaze was found, as both
under and overestimation could be elicited. However,
where no effect of gaze was present, only overestimation
is expected, making a one-tailed test more appropriate.
2.3.2.1. The agentive stimulus. For the agentive stimulus,
there was a significant main effect of gaze direction in each
of the three test stimulus levels. In the 20/+10 asym-
metrical experimental trials (F(2,42) = 5.76, p = .006,
g2p ¼ :22), the gaze-ahead condition elicited significantly
more ‘after’ choices than the gaze-lagging condition
(t(21) = 3.71, p = .001). However, responses in the gaze
congruent condition did not differ significantly from re-
sponses in either the gaze-ahead (t(21) = 1.86, p = .08) or
gaze-lagging conditions (t(21) = 1.42, p = .17).
In the symmetrical experimental (10/+10) trials,
(F(2,42) = 15.11, p < .001, g2p ¼ :42), the gaze-lagging condi-
tion elicited significantly less ‘after’ choices than both the
gaze-ahead (t(21) = 5.44, p < .001) and gaze congruent con-
ditions (t(21) = 3.92, p = .001), the responses of which did
not differ from each other (t(21) = .93, p = .36). Because of
this difference, the one sample t-tests were conducted for
each gaze direction condition (p = .017), which showed
only responses in the gaze-lagging condition to differ sig-
nificantly from 50% (t(21) = 2.9, p = .008), whereas re-
sponses in the gaze-ahead (t(21) = 2.27, p = .03) and gaze
congruent (t(21) = .95, p = .36) levels did not.
In the 10/+20 asymmetrical experimental trials
(F(2,42) = 8.77, p = .001, g2p ¼ :3), the mean percentage of‘after’ choices was significantly greater in the gaze-ahead
condition than in the gaze congruent (t(21) = 2.63, p =
.016) or gaze-lagging conditions (t(21) = 4.04, p = .001), be-
tween which responses did not differ significantly from
each other (t(21) = 1.88, p = .08).
2.3.2.2. The non-agentive stimulus. For the non-agentive
stimulus, there was no main effect of ‘gaze’ direction in
any of the test stimulus levels. Because of this, the ‘gaze’
direction levels were collapsed in the symmetrical experi-
mental trials for the one sample t-test. This showed that
the mean percentage of ‘after’ choices (63.0%, SD = 48.3)
was significantly greater than the test value of 50%
(t(21) = 3.4, p = .002).
For the interaction between stimulus type and test
stimulus, one-way ANOVAs with stimulus type as a
repeated measures factor show the non-agentive stimulus
to elicit more ‘after’ choices in the 10/+10 trials
(F(1,21) = 10.31, p = .004, g2p ¼ :33) and 10/+20 trials
(F(1,21) = 41.07, p < .001, g2p ¼ :66), but not in the 20/
+10 trials (F(2,21) = 3.06, p = .095, g2p ¼ :13). The different
effects of gaze direction between the stimulus types can
account for this interaction. The rotation of the agentive
stimulus was underestimated in the gaze-lagging condi-
tion, whereas the non-agentive stimulus elicited overesti-
mation irrespective of ‘gaze’ direction. A lower overall
percentage of ‘after’ choices is therefore expected where
the effect of gaze was strongest.
2.4. Discussion
The agentive and non-agentive nature of the stimuli
produced different results. There was a significant overall
effect of gaze direction for the agentive stimulus. That is,
despite the stopping angle of the head being equivocal in
all conditions, estimations of how far it had rotated were
influenced by the direction of its gaze. Specifically, head
rotations were underestimated when gaze was looking in
the opposite direction of motion, as compared to looking
straight ahead or in advance of head rotation. The equiva-
430 M. Hudson et al. / Cognition 112 (2009) 423–434lent of the ‘gaze’ manipulation in the non-agentive condi-
tion had no such effect. In the non-agentive condition, esti-
mations of the degree of rotation were the same
irrespective of the visual appearance of the black and white
cubes designed to mimic the relative positions of the pupil
and sclera in the agentive condition. This is all the more
remarkable as the black squares in the non-agentive condi-
tion were larger and considerably more pronounced than
the pupils in the agentive condition. It supports the con-
tention that the biases in estimating head rotation elicited
by gaze direction are due to inferences made by the obser-
ver regarding the agent’s intention to move further, or not
to move further, in the specified direction, and are not due
to the low-level visual appearance of the pupil shifting
within the sclera.
However, whilst the black and white cubes of the
non-agentive stimulus may have imitated the sclera/pupil
positions of the eye, they failed to replicate other impor-
tant aspects of gaze processing necessary for the inference
of social significance. Firstly, the face presents a unique
pattern of internal features, with the eyes occupying an
important place within it (Barton, Zhao, & Keenan, 2003).
Indeed, it is difficult to view a stimulus that possesses such
a pattern without perceiving it as representing a face. The
vertical orientation of the white cubes in the current study
failed to replicate this distinctive configuration.
Secondly, the social significance of gaze direction de-
pends on its spatial meaning, which is used by the observer
to unambiguously determine where the other person is
looking. This directional information is processed reflex-
ively, as indicated by studies in which the detection of a
target was facilitated if preceded by a centrally presented
gaze directed at the target location, but not when directed
elsewhere (Frischen, Bayliss, & Tipper, 2007; Ricciardelli,
Bonfiglioli, Iani, Rubichi, & Nicoletti, 2007)). Again, the
non-agentive stimulus did not possess this quality and
therefore the observer could not determine the ‘direction’Fig. 5. The two non-agentive stimuli used in Experiment 2. (A) The white cube
Examples show the end-points in each ‘gaze’ direction condition (i) ‘gaze’ ahead
additional congruent condition was used with the arrows pointing down).of the manipulations in the same way as for the agentive
stimulus. For these reasons, a second experiment was con-





Thirty-three participants (27 females), with a mean age
of 20.3 years (SD = 4.4 years), took part. All other informa-
tion is the same as for Experiment 1.
3.1.2. Stimuli
Stimulus creation and presentation was the same as in
Experiment 1.
3.1.2.1. Horizontal ‘eyes’. The black and white cubes were
placed in a horizontal orientation to reflect the position
of the eyes in a face. However, as noted earlier, even the
most rudimentary resemblance to a facial configuration
is sufficient to evoke the perception of a face. In order to
implement the design without creating the impression of
a face, four additional white squares were introduced to
disrupt the face-like configuration (Fig. 5A).
3.1.2.2. Arrow ‘eyes’. The black and white cubes of Experi-
ment 1 were replaced by two arrows. Arrows are a sym-
bolic cue of spatial direction (Ricciardelli et al., 2007) and
orient an observer’s attention in a similar manner as gaze
direction (Frischen et al., 2007). The surface was given a
brick texture in order to reinforce the impression of a
non-agentive object (Fig. 5B).
For both stimuli, these variable features were superim-
posed onto the surface of the stimulus rather than protrud-
ing from it, and the number of fins was reduced from threes are oriented horizontally. (B) The white cubes are replaced by arrows.
, (ii) ‘gaze’ lagging, and (iii) ‘gaze’ congruent. (For the arrows stimulus, an
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ble the eyes, nose and chin of the agentive stimulus in
Experiment 1 so as to provide a more accurate control.
There were 192 trials in total, with 96 consisting of sym-
metrical experimental trials (2 stimulus type  2 retention
interval  3 gaze direction  8 repetitions). The direction
of motion (left/right) and screen positions of the test stim-
ulus choices were counterbalanced across trials. The
remaining trials were distributed equally amongst the
other levels of Test stimulus (24 trials each). All other as-
pects of the stimuli, experimental design, procedure and
method of analysis were identical to Experiment 1.
3.2. Results
The mean error rate was 13.2% (SD = 10.1). Partici-
pants and trials were excluded based on the same criteria
as in Experiment 1, resulting in 7 participants being
removed. Of the remaining 26 participants, a total of 2.6%
trials were excluded. No further participants were ex-
cluded on the basis of information given in the feedback
forms.
A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted with stim-
ulus type (horizontal eyes vs. arrows), Retention interval
(absent vs. present), Gaze direction (ahead vs. congruent
vs. lagging behind) and Test stimulus (20/+10 vs.
10/+10 vs. 10/+20) entered as the main effects. As
in Experiment 1, the 40/+10 and 10/+40 (catch con-Fig. 6. Mean percentage of ‘after’ choices for each ‘gaze’ direction across each lev
and arrows (right) (retention interval collapsed).
Table 2




40/+10 98.1 (8.1) 97.1 (6.8) 97.1 (8.1
20/+10 84.2 (20.6) 77.2 (17.7) 78.4 (25.
10/+10 68.5 (26.8) 65.3 (23.7) 67.5 (24.
10/+20 36.4 (34.5) 42.0 (29.3) 42.4 (35.
10/+40 18.2 (16.5) 10.7 (20.1) 18.8 (21.dition) were not included as levels in the test stimulus
condition.
Apart from the expected significant main effect of test
stimulus (F(2,50) = 77.9, p < .001, g2p ¼ :76), there were no
other significant main effects nor any significant interac-
tions. Crucially, there was no effect of Gaze direction
(F(2,50) = .813, p = .449, g2p ¼ :032) nor of stimulus type
(F(1,25) = 3.44, p = .075, g2p ¼ :121), and there was no inter-
action between the two (F(2,50) = .937, p = .399, g2p ¼ :036)
(See Table 2 and Fig. 6).
With ‘gaze’ direction and retention interval collapsed,
the horizontal ‘eye’ stimulus showed a significant response
bias (mean = 67.1%, SD = 47.0) toward overestimation of
the final angle (t(25) = 3.75, p < .001), as did the arrow stim-
ulus (mean = 58.8%, SD = 49.2) (t = 1.94, df = 25, p = .032).
To directly compare these results to those of
Experiment 1, the two non-agentive stimulus types of
Experiment 2 were collapsed, and entered into a be-
tween-subject ANOVA with the agentive stimulus of
Experiment 1 as the second level. Retention interval, Test
stimulus and Gaze direction were entered as within-sub-
jects factors. There was a significant main effect of Gaze
direction (F(2,92) = 18.2, p < .001, g2p ¼ :28), and crucially
this interacted with the between-subjects factor stimulus
type (F(2,92) = 9.62, p < .001, g2p ¼ :17). There were no
other significant main effects or interactions, apart from
a main effect of Test stimulus (F(2,92) = 176.32, p < .001,
g2p ¼ :79).el of test stimulus for two non-agentive stimuli with horizontal ‘eyes’ (left)
stimulus for the two non-agentive stimuli. SDs of the mean percentages are
Arrows
Ahead Congruent Lagging
) 97.1 (6.8) 98.0 (8.1) 95.2 (10.0)
5) 77.5 (22.9) 75.5 (21.7) 75.5 (25.7)
3) 59.9 (23.0) 61.2 (26.0) 55.4 (24.7)
2) 41.0 (28.7) 33.7 (28.1) 30.3 (28.2)
8) 20.4 (9.2) 4.0 (26.5) 11.7 (19.0)
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The aim of Experiment 2 was to incorporate two facets
of gaze processing into the non-agentive stimulus that the
original of Experiment 1 did not possess: horizontal align-
ment of the eyes and the directional meaning of gaze. The
results showed that estimations of object rotation were not
influenced by these visual manipulations, neither when
oriented to simulate the configuration of the eyes in the
agentive stimulus, nor when they held an analogous spatial
meaning to that of gaze direction. These results are compa-
rable to those of the non-agentive stimulus in Experiment
1 and therefore further corroborated the main conclusion
drawn from Experiment 1, which is that social information
conveyed by gaze direction underlies the variations in esti-
mations of head rotation, not their low-level visual appear-
ance nor their spatial meaning. Despite there being no
variation in response to the ‘gaze’ manipulations (ahead,
lagging, congruent), overestimation of the degree of rota-
tion was evident when they were collapsed, much like
the non-agentive stimulus in Experiment 1, suggesting
that the motion of the non-agentive stimuli was subject
to a conventional RM effect.4. General discussion
This study investigated whether the processing of so-
cial cues that are indicative of an agent’s intentions med-
iated the remembered final position of an action sequence
performed by the agent. A rotating head was used to
gauge the amount of agentive motion, while varying gaze
direction served as a means to control the attributed
intentions of the action. Several non-agentive control
stimuli that contained visual features equivalent to the
eyes of the agentive stimulus were also tested. These con-
trolled for the low-level visual appearance, orientation
and spatial meaning of the gaze direction. The stopping
point of a rotating head was misjudged if its gaze direc-
tion was incongruent with the direction of head motion.
That is, the final angle of the head rotation was underes-
timated when gaze was looking in the opposite direction
of the head motion as compared to looking straight ahead
or in advance of head rotation. The non-agentive stimuli
did not evoke any variation in estimated degree of
rotation.
It should be noted that because the immediate percep-
tual history was provided, inferences about the future tra-
jectory of both the agentive and non-agentive motions
were unambiguous. This is relevant, because when pre-
sented as a static posture, an incongruent gaze and head
orientation would not specify the future direction of mo-
tion, as head rotation may have been either towards or
away from the target of attention. Head orientation is a sig-
nificant factor in the processing of gaze direction, and
probably helps mediating its social relevance (Hietanen,
1999; Seyama & Nagayama, 2005). The current results
unequivocally demonstrate the effect of involuntary
intentional coding on the perception and memory of action
sequences, and a social cue related anticipation of move-
ment (‘SCRAM’ hereafter).4.1. The relative strengths of the ‘gaze-ahead’ and ‘gaze-
lagging’ effects
We hypothesized that when the gaze of an agentive
stimulus was directed at the goal of the action (gaze-ahead
condition), participants would overestimate the rotational
angle of the head, and when gaze was directed opposite to
the direction of the goal of the action (gaze-lagging condi-
tion) participants would underestimated the angle. It was
assumed that that gaze directed at the action goal reflects
a larger degree of intentional motivation to reach or
achieve the goal than gaze directed opposite to the action
direction (Jellema et al., 2000). Both the gaze-ahead and
gaze-lagging conditions should therefore have been signif-
icantly different from the gaze congruent condition, lead-
ing to over and underestimation respectively. However,
in the crucial 10/+10 condition, only the results in the
gaze-lagging condition supported the hypothesis, whereas
the gaze-ahead condition did not differ significantly from
gaze congruent. These results suggest that the main effect
of SCRAM lies predominantly with the gaze-lagging condi-
tion. Apparently participants did not infer any greater
intentional information when gaze was directed in ad-
vance of head rotation. There are at least three possible
reasons for this asymmetry.
Firstly, as a change in gaze direction is a faster and more
energy–efficient way to direct attention than a head turn,
gaze direction typically ‘leads’ the motion of the head
and other body parts (Bertenthal & Von Hofsten, 1998).
As a result, gaze-ahead is more perceptually common than
gaze-lagging. Possibly, the atypical configuration of gaze
and head movement in the gaze-lagging condition made
it more conspicuous and was ‘picked up’ and processed
more readily. Secondly, even though the deviations of the
ahead and lagging gaze directions from head orientation
were 20 either way, there may have been an asymmetry
in the amount of sclera visible, with more sclera visible
in the gaze-lagging than in the gaze-ahead condition.
Therefore, the visible difference between the lagging and
congruent conditions may have been greater than that be-
tween the ahead and congruent conditions. The ratio of
visible dark pupil with respect to white sclera is a deter-
mining factor in ascertaining gaze direction (Symons, Lee,
Cedrone, & Nishimura, 2004). Lastly, the difference be-
tween gaze-ahead and gaze congruent may have been
too subtle to detect using the current method. A more sen-
sitive measure using a set of test stimuli with smaller dif-
ferences in orientation between the two choices may have
elicited an effect. However, these factors do not detract
from the robust finding of a consistent difference in the
estimation of the degree of head rotation between the
gaze-ahead and gaze-lagging conditions.
4.2. The role of representational momentum
A secondary aim of this study was to contrast the
displacement of agentive motion with the well established
effect of representational momentum on the motion of
non-agentive stimuli (Freyd & Finke, 1984). In the non-
agentive conditions, there was a significant response bias
to choosing the ‘after’ choice overall, indicative of an over-
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trol stimulus was subject to representational momentum
as a function of the inferred physical forces underpinning
its movement, such as its angular velocity (Hubbard,
2005). However, the proportion of ‘after’ responses elicited
by the non-agentive stimuli did not seem to be influenced
by the presence or absence of a retention interval. Previous
studies have shown that displacement increases as the
retention interval increases up to 250 ms, after which no
further increases are observed (Finke & Freyd, 1985). No
displacement was therefore expected when the retention
interval was absent. A likely explanation for this is related
to the particular test method used in the current study.
Previous studies used one test stimulus, which the partic-
ipant had to compare with the remembered end-point. The
test stimulus in the current study consisted of two objects.
This entailed looking at both choices and making a deci-
sion, which is a more time consuming process. Hence, a
considerable delay between test stimulus onset and press-
ing the response key was always present (mean = 1415 ms,
SD = 665 ms), sufficiently long for displacement to occur,
which is consistent with the proposed necessity of higher
level off-line mechanisms for the anticipatory memory dis-
placement to manifest itself (Hubbard, 2006).
4.3. Possible neural/cognitive substrates for agentive
and non-agentive displacement
Although this study proposes that the anticipation of
both agentive and non-agentive motion elicits a distortion
in memory for the object’s final position, there are reasons
to suggest that these effects are underpinned by different
neural/cognitive processes. Baron-Cohen (2002, 2006) pos-
its two domains from which an observer is able to attribute
causes and constraints underpinning movement in the
environment, so as to allow it to become predictable.
Systemising relates to the movements of both non-agen-
tive and agentive objects as far as these movements are de-
fined by laws of physics, whilst empathising imbues
agentive motion with additional qualities of goal-directed-
ness and intentionality. Hubbard (2006) proposed that the
displacement of non-agentive objects is the result of a two
factor process. Firstly, the kinematics and dynamics of the
object’s motion are represented as a functional analogue
by means of a second order isomorphism (Shepard &
Chipman, 1970). This produces a default displacement
based, not upon objective physical principles, but on the
observer’s subjective interpretation of those principles.
Secondly, this displacement can be modulated by the con-
text in which the motion is embedded, such as the type of
object and the presence of stimuli, which modulate the dis-
placement. The displacement of agentive motion as a func-
tion of social cues observed here concords with this model.
The rotation of the head itself is subject to displacement,
but when contextualized in terms of goal-directedness by
the gaze direction, this displacement is modulated.
The neural mechanism contributing to the SCRAM effect
observed could entail the following: through repeated
observation of action sequences, the STS associates a par-
ticular action with all the (social) cues that accompany
and characterise it, such as gaze direction, precedingmovements, spatial location and targets (Baker, Keysers,
Jellema, Wicker, & Perrett, 2001; Jellema & Perrett,
2003a; Jellema & Perrett, 2003b; Saxe et al., 2004). On
the basis of these statistical inferences it forms expectan-
cies, allowing for the anticipation of the most likely out-
come of an action before it is completed (Perrett et al.,
2006). The STS thus represents the action in a goal-directed
framework. This framework accounts for the mechanistic
and probabilistic aspects of the action, but does not ac-
count for any motivational inferences, such as desires,
fears and beliefs that may motivate the action. However,
the STS projects to the inferior parietal lobe which, along
with the areas in the ventral premotor cortex, constitute
the mirror-neuron system (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004).
This enables simulation of the others’ actions by represent-
ing it in the observer’s motor system, as if the observer
were preparing to perform the action (Gallese, 2006; Iaco-
boni, 2005). One’s own experiences evoked by the sub-
threshold embodied simulation inform the observer about
the agent’s motives. Although mirror neurons have been
predominantly observed to process a limited range of bio-
logical actions, this does not preclude the presence of mir-
ror neurons coding for additional classes of biological
motion such as postures indicative of social attention
direction (Keysers & Perrett, 2004). This is a reflexive pro-
cess and may well underlie the response biases found in
the current study. More complex, or unusual, actions
may require reflective processes to infer or argue the moti-
vational drives (Lieberman et al., 2002).
4.4. Conclusions
Since the intentions underlying agentive motion are
mentalistic in nature, rather than physical, they rely on
the observer’s ability to represent the mental state of the
agent rather than the physical forces acting upon the
movement. The current results demonstrate that the per-
ception of agentive motion is subject to displacement as
a function of involuntary intentional attributions made
by the observer on the basis of bodily cues (SCRAM). This
agrees with recent evidence that social cues contribute to
the observer’s assumptions about how agentive motion
will most likely proceed in the immediate future, and that
different neural/cognitive mechanisms are responsible for
inferences made about agentive and non-agentive motion.
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